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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The “new discrimination” refers to the use of government policy to increase the effective 
gender wage gap, measured in terms of the second earner’s net of tax income gain from 
working in the market place rather than at home.  This paper presents an analysis of the 
tax treatment of family members and shows how the expansion of policy instruments, 
such as family tax benefits withdrawn on joint income and the low income tax offset, has 
raised average and marginal rates on the income of the second earner, typically the 
female partner. The study concludes that this new discrimination, together with limited 
access to affordable, high quality childcare, has severely limited the growth of female 
labour supply needed to fund family support, and is ultimately unsustainable in an ageing 
population. 
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 1
 Introduction 
 
Over the last decade a number of countries, notably the US, the UK and Australia, have 
introduced new tax and welfare programs, or expanded existing programs, that have the 
effect of raising tax rates on the income of the second earner in the family. Examples 
include the earned income tax credit (EITC) program in the US,1 the child tax credit 
(CTC) and working tax credit (WTC) programs in the UK, and the Family Tax Benefit 
(FTB) system in Australia.  Since the second earner is typically the female partner, these 
programs therefore also have the effect of increasing the net-of-tax gender wage gap. 
Many of the same countries have poorly developed, high-cost childcare sectors, and so 
reducing the net wage of the second earner can make childcare unaffordable from her net 
earnings.  In a recent paper,2 I referred to this phenomenon as the “new discrimination”.  
Unlike the “old discrimination”, which took the form of lower gross wage rates and 
poorer opportunities for women in the labour market, the new discrimination is located in 
government policy. 
 
This paper investigates the extent to which the second earner in Australian families has 
become subject to this new discrimination.  The analysis compares effective tax rates on 
primary and second incomes and identifies the changes introduced in the 2006-07 
Budget. A key finding of the study is that second earners in families on less than average 
wages now face the highest average tax rates in the economy.  This outcome is identified 
as a consequence of a series of changes in four key policy instruments used by 
government to set tax rates on family incomes: the personal income tax schedule, Family 
Tax Benefits (FTBs), the Medicare Levy and the low income tax offset.  
 
Changes in these policy instruments under the Howard Government have introduced a 
major restructuring of effective rates on the incomes of married couples with children.3  
Second earners, at any given level of income, no longer face the same marginal and 
                                                 
1 See Ellwood and Liebman (2000) and Eissa and Hoynes (2005) for studies that identify the changes in 
effective tax rates introduced by these programs. 
2 Apps (2006a). 
3 See Apps (2004) for an analysis of earlier years. 
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average tax rates as primary earners, as they would under a progressive individual income 
tax. Instead they face much higher marginal rates, and therefore much higher average 
rates, from the first dollar earned, consistent with a system of joint taxation.  As a result, 
a two-earner family working long hours in the market can pay close to the same amount 
of tax as a single-earner family with the same income and one parent working full-time at 
home.  This is a defining feature of joint taxation. 
 
A central assumption of the argument for joint taxation is that the combined income of 
parents provides a reliable measure of family living standards and, therefore, that 
distributional effects can be assessed on the basis of tax burdens as a percentage of family 
income.  A recent example is the OECD’s (2006) comparisons of tax burdens as a 
percentage of the combined gross wage earnings of couples.4  This is a mistake.  
Combined earnings do not provide a reliable measure of living standards unless 
households with the same gross wage rates and family responsibilities make the same 
labour supply and domestic work choices.  The data show they do not.   
 
Household survey data indicate a very high degree of heterogeneity in the labour supply 
of married mothers across seemingly identical families.  In fact, the distribution tends to 
be bimodal. In a large proportion of families, the mother works full-time at home 
providing childcare and related services, and in an almost equally large proportion she 
works full-time in the market using her income to buy-in substitute services.5  A young 
family in which both parents work full time to earn, say $80,000 pa, cannot be considered 
to have the same standard of living as another in which one parent alone can earn 
$80,000 in the market while the other works full-time at home.6 A tax system that 
imposes equal burdens on these families is unfair.  When the work choices of parents 
vary in this way, a progressive individual income tax system is required for fairness in the 
                                                 
4 See Tables III.5c, p.92, III.6c, p.95, and III.7c, p.98. 
5 For a life cycle analysis that shows this using Australian data see Apps and Rees (2003). 
6 The argument against this proposition implies two key assumptions: that a parent working full-time at 
home caring for young children is unproductive and her life of leisure is supported by an altruistic hand-out 
from her husband equal to half his income.   
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treatment of families with the same standard of living, and of those with varying living 
standards, that is, for horizontal and vertical equity.   
 
It is also well established that individual taxation is superior to joint taxation for 
efficiency reasons.  Extensive empirical research indicates that the labour supply of 
married mothers tends to be more responsive to a fall in the net wage than that of prime 
aged males.  The result has a straightforward explanation. After the arrival of the first 
child, home production, in particular home childcare, becomes a close substitute for 
market alternatives.  As a result, the labour supply of the parent with the lower wage 
becomes more highly responsive to a fall in the net wage because it reduces the implicit 
price of services produced at home relative to the price of the market alternatives. In 
other words, high effective tax rates on the second earner create a large wedge7 between 
the market and home price of childcare,8 and can therefore be expected to have a strong 
negative effect on female labour supply and, in turn, on the tax base and overall 
efficiency of the economy.  This is consistent with the well-established Boskin and 
Sheshinski (1983) result on the taxation of couples – an individual tax system with lower 
marginal rates on married women as second earners is required for efficiency.9 
 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 uses data for a sample of “in work” families 
drawn from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2003-04 Survey of Income and 
Housing (SIH) to show, first, the extent to which low and average wage families working 
long hours can be misrepresented as high wage earners according to a welfare ranking 
defined on household income. Section 3 goes on to identify the distribution of tax 
burdens across single and two-earner families, and the effective rates that apply to the 
incomes of primary and second earners, using the same data set.  The section also 
                                                 
7 See Jaumotte (2003) for estimates of the “tax wedge” for OECD countries, calculated as the ratio of the 
effective tax on the second earner’s income and the tax she would face as a single individual with the same 
income. 
8 As does high-cost, for profit, childcare in an imperfect capital market (see Apps, 2003). 
9 The Boskin and Sheshinski analysis is an application of the Ramsey pricing rule: for efficiency, effective 
tax rates should be related inversely to (compensated) wage/price elasticities.  For a more recent empirical 
analysis which comes to a similar conclusion, see Feldstein and Feenberg (1996) 
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presents results for the changes introduced in the 2006-07 Budget.  A concluding 
comment is contained in Section 4. 
 
 
2 Household income – an unfair tax base 
  
 
Household income, with or without an equivalence scale adjustment,10 is a seriously 
misleading measure of family living standards because it omits the family’s implicit 
income from household production.  Studies that attempt to assess the distributional 
impact of a tax reform based on changes in net household income can be shown to imply 
a model of the family that ignores two empirically important observations: (i) that 
household production, and especially home childcare, becomes a close substitute for 
bought-in market services after the arrival of the first child, and (ii) that there is a high 
degree of heterogeneity in the labour supply of married mothers across families with the 
same earning capacities and demographic characteristics.11  
 
The second observation - heterogeneity in market vs. domestic work choices - is central.  
If families with the same wage rates and demographic characteristics were observed to 
make the same time allocation decisions, then, all else being equal, household income 
could be found to be strongly correlated with wage rates, and therefore with living 
standards.  However, with heterogeneity in the labour supply of one parent, this is no 
longer the case.  Moreover, the problem of “ranking errors” becomes especially serious 
when, as the analysis to follow will show, the profile of primary wage earnings for full-
time work is relatively flat across the middle of the distribution and then rises sharply at 
the top. 
 
The analysis is based on data for a sample of 1945 two-parent families from the ABS 
2003-04 SIH survey selected on the criteria that the family is a couple income unit with 
dependent children and at least one parent is employed and earning above $15,000 per 
annum. These criteria exclude very few records.  Less than a quarter of one per cent of 
                                                 
10 For a critique of equivalence scales, see Apps and Rees (2002). 
11 See Apps and Rees (1999, 2005). 
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two-parent families reports both parents as unemployed.12 The sample is also limited to 
families with earnings principally from wages and salaries and with non-negative 
incomes from earnings, investments and unincorporated enterprises. All incomes reported 
in this section are indexed to the 2006-07 financial year.  
 
The parent with the higher private income is defined as the “primary earner”. Private 
income, as defined by the ABS (2005), is income from all non-government sources such 
as wages and salaries, profits, investment income and superannuation.  The primary 
earner is the male partner in 87 per cent of records and therefore in much of the 
discussion to follow the second earner will be referred to as the female partner.  
 
Table 1 reports the incomes and employment status of primary and second earners across 
a quintile ranking of families defined on primary income.13  From the table it can be seen 
that 93.4 per cent of primary earners are employed full-time and 6.6 per cent are in part-
time work, reflecting the fact that there is very little variation in the labour supply of 
working age males.  This contrasts with a high degree of heterogeneity in the labour 
supply of working age females, as indicated by the widely varying full-time and part-time 
employment rates within each quintile. Of second earners, only 29.7 per cent are in full-
time work and 36.4 per cent in part-time work. The remainder - over a third - is not in the 
workforce. 
Table 1:  Quintile distribution of “in-work” families by primary income, 2006-07 
 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Primary earner       
Primary income $pa 31004 43680 54445 67417 120055 63447 
Primary earnings $pa 30739 42972 53831 65677 114523 61663 
%  employed full time 84.6 94.1 94.0 97.6 96.9 93.4 
Second earner       
Second income $pa 11736 18888 21203 24701 26862 20670 
Second earnings $pa 11185 17809 20560 23344 22978 19159 
% employed full time 25.4 34.6 32.2 30.8 25.6 29.7 
% employed part time 29.9 34.4 37.4 42.2 38.1 36.4 
                                                 
12 Of male partners in all two-parent families, 83.6 per cent are in full-time work, 6.7 per cent are in part-
time work and 2.5 per cent are unemployed.  Of married mothers in the same sample, 27.9 per cent are in 
full-time employment, 37.6 per cent are in part-time work and 2.3 per cent report being unemployed. 
13 Note that asset income is given by the difference between income and earnings and, on average, 
contributes little to family incomes except in the top quintile.  
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Note the relatively flat profile of primary income and earnings across quintiles 2 to 4.  
Within each quintile we can expect considerable variation in the second income, given 
the variation in employment status. Thus, a ranking defined on household income could 
well place a two-earner family working long hours for relatively low wages near to the 
top quintile, due to the relatively flat profile of primary earnings across the middle 
quintiles.  To show this more clearly, Table 2 presents data means for the incomes and 
labour supplies of two household groups of equal size, labelled Type 1 and Type 2, 
defined according to hours worked by the second earner.  Type 1 households are those in 
which the second earner’s annual hours are below the median of the sample, and Type 2, 
those in which her hours are above the median.  
 
Table 2:  Quintile distribution by primary income and household type, 2006-07 
 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Type 1       
Primary earnings $pa 30701 43254 53971 66044 123004 64016 
Second earnings $pa 3632 6542 8214 10821 9755 19159 
Primary market hours pa  2058 2273 2326 2362 2544 2314 
Second market hours pa 54 272 289 447 202 253 
Type 2       
Primary earnings $pa 30779 42705 53685 65258 105287 59193 
Second earnings $pa 19047 28494 33340 37655 37404 19159 
Primary market hours pa  2132 2233 2269 2386 2508 2303 
Second market hours pa 1754 1899 1949 1991 1873 1892 
 
 
Figure 1 plots the primary and second hours profiles of the two household types, and 
Figure 2, the corresponding earnings profiles.  The figures show graphically the very 
large gap between the average hours worked by the second earner of each type, and the 
correspondingly large gap between average second earnings, within each quintile.  In 
contrast, the average primary earner in both household types works almost the same 
hours and has similar earnings, reflecting similar gross wage rates, except in the top 
quintile.  It is evident from these profiles that little of the variation in female labour 
supply can be explained by primary wage rates, other than in the top quintile.  Nor can it 
be explained adequately by demographics. The average number of dependent children in 
the Type 1 household is 2.0 and in the Type 2 household, 1.8.   
 7
 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1 2 3 4 5
Primary income quintile
An
nu
al
 h
ou
rs
 o
f w
or
k
Male hours Type 1
Male hours Type 2
Female hours Type 1
Female hours Type 2
 
Figure 1 Family Labour supplies by type 
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Figure 2 Primary and second earnings by household type 
 
 
We know from time use data that mothers who withdraw from market work after the first 
child spend long hours providing home childcare and related services that they would 
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otherwise need to buy-in, unless they have access to an “extended family” arrangement.14   
It is therefore essential to take account of home production in a measure of family 
welfare, in order to avoid the potential for large ranking errors as indicated by Table 2.  
For example, the average joint income of Type 2 families in quintile 2 is close to that of 
Type 1 families in quintile 4, yet much, if not all, of the net-of-tax second income of a 
Type 2 family may be spent on bought-in childcare. Under these conditions, primary 
income is likely to be a far more reliable indicator of family living standards. 
 
To highlight further the potential for ranking errors of this kind, Table 3 presents the 
earnings profiles of Type 1 and Type 2 families, for a ranking by household income   The 
table also reports the quintile distribution of the household types and the hours they work.   
Over half of the two-earner families in the bottom quintile of primary income are shifted 
to a higher quintile, and only 30 percent remain in the bottom two quintiles.  It is evident 
from the earnings and hours profiles that a ranking by household income is driven by the 
market hours of the second earner, rather than by wage rates, and therefore indirectly, by 
the omission of implicit income from home production in household income as the 
ranking variable. 
 
Table 3:  Quintile distribution by household income and household type, 2006-07 
 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Household income $pa 37057 57841 74557 94332 153981 84117 
% type 2 24.4 35.4 52.4 67.4 63.6 50.0 
Type 1 %       
Primary earnings $pa 35050 51837 62595 73545 136289 64016 
Primary market hours pa  2118 2260 2362 2389 2563 2314 
Second market hours pa 56 226 430 471 286 253 
Type 2 %       
Primary earnings $pa 29135 37866 45841 58968 92885 59193 
Primary market hours pa  2132 2140 2284 2321 2452 2303 
Second market hours pa 1620 1809 1917 1904 2004 1892 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 See Apps and Rees (2003, 2005). 
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3 Family Tax System 
 
We now turn to an analysis of the structure of effective tax rates on the incomes of family 
members, due to the interaction of the personal income tax with the Family Tax Benefit 
(FTB) system, the low income tax offset and Medicare Levy.  Marginal and average rates 
on primary and second earnings are computed for the sample of “in-work” families 
described in the previous section, and reported for a ranking of families defined on 
primary income as in Tables 1 and 2.  Results are presented for two financial years, 2005-
06 and 2006-07, to show the impact of changes in the 2006-07 Budget on the distribution 
of the family tax burden between primary and second earners.  All incomes are indexed 
to the relevant financial year.  
 
Table 4 reports, in row 1, the amount of tax the representative family in each quintile 
would pay if the second earner did not go out to work.15 The figures therefore give 
estimates of the average amount of tax families would pay on primary earnings and asset 
income in each quintile, if second earnings were zero. For the full sample, the overall 
average is $6,648 pa.  The second row of the table reports the resulting average tax rates 
(ATRs) on primary earnings and asset income.  For the full sample, the ATR is 10.3 per 
cent.  In other words, if all second earners withdrew from work, the overall average rate 
of tax on family income would be 10.3 percent.   
 
Table 4:  Tax burdens on “in-work” families, budget 2006-07  
 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
All families – zero second earnings   
Tax on primary + asset income $pa -7401 -1669 2929 8353 30760 6648 
ATR % -23.6 -3.7 5.3 12.1 24.8 10.3 
Second earner       
Tax on second earnings $pa 3871 6314 6538 7197 7425 6266 
ATR on second earnings % 34.6 35.4 31.8 30.8 32.3 32.7 
 
 
The third row of the table shows the tax on the income of the second earner, calculated 
for each record as the increment in the family’s tax burden due to her participation in the 
                                                 
15 All figures are weighted means. 
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labour market.  The overall average is $6,266 pa. The final row gives the quintile profile 
of ATRs on second earnings. The overall ATR on the second income is 32.7 percent, 
more than three times the ATR on primary earnings and asset income. 
 
These results indicate a very high degree of tax discrimination against the second earner.  
The average tax paid by the representative family in the sample is $12,914, the sum of the 
amount paid as a single-earner family, $6,648, and the tax on second earnings, $6,266.  
Thus, if all families had only one earner or, equivalently, if all second earners withdrew 
from work, average tax per family in the sample would fall from  $12,914 pa to $6,648 
pa, that is, by 48.5 per cent.  This dramatic fall is due to very high effective ATRs on 
second earnings.  ATRs on primary income, and therefore on the incomes of single-
earner families, are not only low on average but highly progressive.  We have a negative 
income tax up to the second quintile, with those in quintile 1 receiving a net transfer that 
averages $7,401 pa.  The ATR rises to 5.3 per cent in quintile 3, and to 24.8 per cent in 
quintile 5.  This progressive taxation of primary incomes contrasts with the treatment of 
second earnings.  Not only are ATRs on second earnings much higher, at over 30 per cent 
in all quintiles, the highest rate appears in quintile 2.  
 
In an earlier paper I made the same calculation for the 2005-06 financial year using data 
for a sample of “in-work” families from the earlier ABS 2002-03 SIH survey.16  The data 
for the sample of families selected for the present study, with incomes indexed to 2005-
06, yield very similar figures.  The results are presented in Tables 5 in the same format as 
Table 4, showing in addition the changes in ATRs that flowed from the tax cuts 
introduced in the 2006-07 Budget.     
 
The changes in ATRs reveal an especially interesting outcome of the 2006-07 Budget. 
The average family tax burden is computed as $14,415 for 2005-06, and found to fall to 
$8,196 when calculated to exclude second earnings.  This implies an effective average 
tax burden on the second earner of $6,219 pa, which is 43.4 per cent of the overall 
average family tax burden.  Thus, the changes in the 2006-07 Budget increased the 
                                                 
16 Apps (2006b) 
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relative share of the burden on the second earner, from 43.4 per cent to over 48.5 per cent 
- a rise of over 5 percentage points.   
 
Table  5:  Tax burdens on “in-work” families, budget 2005-06 
 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Panel 1   
Tax on primary+asset income $pa -6303 -92 4176 9560 33596 8196 
ATR % -20.4 -0.0 7.7 14.2 27.7 12.9 
2006-07 change in ATR  -3.2 -3.7 -2.4 -2.1 -2.9 -2.6 
Panel 2   
Tax on second earnings $pa 4286 5940 6285 7175 7411 6219 
ATR % 39.1 34.0 31.2 31.4 32.8 33.1 
2006-07 change in ATR  -4.5 1.4 0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 
 
 
This shift in the family tax burden towards the second earner was achieved by reducing 
the absolute burden on the primary earner, from an average of $8,196 to $$6,648, while 
leaving the absolute burden on the second earner almost unchanged.  The fall in the tax 
burden on primary earner and asset income results in an overall reduction in the ATR on 
that income of 2.6 percentage points and, within each quintile, a consistent gain of over 2 
percentage points.  In contrast, the overall change in the ATR on second earnings is close 
to zero.17  There is a more substantial gain in quintile 1, of 4.5 percentage points, but this 
is then offset by losses in quintiles 2 and 3.  In other words, the tax burden on second 
earners in these low-income quintiles actually increased in absolute value, due to the 
2006-07 Budget changes. 
 
This shift in the overall family tax burden to the second earner was achieved by 
combining personal income tax cuts for high income earners with tax-cuts for average 
income single-earner families through the expansion of the FTB system and tax cuts for 
very low income earners through the expansion of the low income tax offset.  In the 
discussion to follow, the specific changes in these policy instruments in the 2006-07 
                                                 
17 Note that even though the tax on second earnings in fact rose slightly in 2006-07, the increase was not in 
line with the indexed rise in earnings.  This explains the fall in the overall ATR of 0.4 of a percentage 
point. 
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Budget are explained in some detail, to show how they shift the tax burden to the second 
earner, as reported in Table 5. 
 
Table 6, Panel 1, lists the personal income tax rate schedules and thresholds for 2005-06 
and 2006-07 financial years.  The rise in the $21,600 threshold to $25,000 provides a tax 
cut of $510 pa for an individual within the income ranges of $25,000 to $63,000 pa.  The 
shift in the threshold of $63,000 to $75,000 for the 30 cents in the dollar rate gives an 
individual with an income of $75,000 an additional tax cut of $1,440.  For someone on an 
income of $150,000, these changes, together with the top threshold and rate changes, 
provide a total tax cut of $6,200.  Thus the personal income tax changes are very 
generous to the top, give little to the middle, and nothing to the bottom. 
 
Table 6:   Income tax schedule and low income tax offset  
 
Panel 1:    Income tax schedule 
2005-06: Taxable Income  MTR  2006-07: Taxable Income MTR  
$0 - $6,000 
$6,001 - $21,600 
$21,601 - $63,000 
$63,001 - $95,000 
$95,000 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.30 
0.42 
0.47 
$0 - $6,000 
$6,001 - $25,000 
$25,001 - $75,000 
$75,001 - $150,000 
$150,000 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.30 
0.40 
0.45 
 
Panel 2:    Income tax schedule + low income tax offset 
2005-06: Taxable Income  MTR  2006-07 Taxable income MTR 
$0 - $7,567 
$7,568 - $21,600 
$21,601 - $27,475 
$27,476 - $63,000 
$63,001 - $95,000 
$95,000 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.34 
0.30 
0.42 
0.47 
$0 - $10,000 
$10,001-25,000 
$25,001 - $40,000 
$40,001- $75,000 
$75,001 - $150,000 
$150,00 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.34 
0.30 
0.40 
0.45 
 
 
A tax cut for very low-income earners is provided by increasing the low income tax 
offset, from $235 to $600. The argument for an offset of this kind usually runs as follows.  
The aim of government is to reduce taxes on low and average income workers. One way 
of achieving this is to raise the zero-rated threshold to, say, $10,000.  However, the 
resulting gain of $600 would go to all taxpayers above this threshold, including those on 
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$150,000.  And so, it is typically argued,18 a more effective use of government revenue is 
achieved by targeting the tax cut to the preferred low-income group through a tax offset.   
 
Limiting the tax cut to those on low incomes is, however, clearly not the concern of the 
Howard Government, given the large tax cuts at the top. To the contrary, the purpose of 
the offset is to deny those across a wide middle band of the earnings distribution, 
specifically from $40,000 to $63,0000, a tax cut of $600, while simultaneously providing 
much larger cuts at higher income levels.  This is evident from Panel 2 of the table, which 
lists the effective MTR schedules in the two financial years incorporating the low income 
tax offset.  In effect, the offset raises the MTR on incomes from $25,000 to $40,000 to 34 
cents in the dollar, thereby introducing a “hump” in the MTR profile across relatively low 
incomes. The offset is, in fact, an entirely redundant policy instrument.  The same rate 
changes could have been announced simply, and more transparently, as the new MTR 
schedule shown in Panel 2. This would, of course, clarify the role of the offset as that of 
limiting to $510 the personal income tax cut for a parent earning from $40,000 and 
$63,000. 
 
However, not every parent within this income range is denied a more substantial gain.  
As in previous budgets, single-earner families, and those in which the second earner’s 
income is marginal, are compensated through the FTB system. It is only two-earner 
families with a more equal division of income who are left out in the cold.  The increase 
in the lower income threshold for the withdrawal of FTB Part A from $34,290 ($33,361 
in 2005-06) to $40,000 provides a tax cut of $1,142 for each child up to the income level 
at which this gain is the remaining amount to be withdrawn.  For the two-earner family in 
which the second earner has a more significant workforce attachment, the gain can be 
entirely lost at relatively low wage levels because FTB Part A is withdrawn on joint 
income.  
 
The following tables illustrate the impact of the system in 2005-06, and of the changes 
introduced in the 2006-07 Budget, for the family with three children under 12, including 
                                                 
18 The argument, of course, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the different policy 
instruments in setting the tax rate structure, as discussed in section 2 of Apps (2006b).   
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one under 5 years, and with income from earnings only. Table 7 first of all lists effective 
marginal tax rate rates and thresholds for the single-earner family, for the two financial 
years.  The rates are calculated to include income taxes, the low income tax offset, the 
Medicare Levy and FTBs Part A and Part B.  Since second earnings are zero, the family 
is eligible for the full amount of FTB Part B, that is, for $3372.60 in 2005-06 and 
$3,467.50 in 2006-07.   
 
     Table 7:   Effective marginal tax rates schedules for the single-earner family 
 
2005-06 2006-07 
Taxable income  MTR Taxable income  MTR 
$0 - $7,567 
$7,568 - $21,600 
$21,601 -$27,475  
$27,476 - $33,361 
$33,362 - $34,226 
$34,227 - $37,001 
$37,002 - $63,000 
$63,001- $69,715 
$69,716 - $93,074 
$93,075 - $95,000 
$95,001- $110,850 
$110,850+ 
0.00 
0.15 
0.34 
0.30 
0.50 
0.70 
0.515 
0.635 
0.435 
0.735 
0.785 
0.485 
$0 - $10,000 
$10,001- $25,000 
$25,001 - $35,048  
$35,049 - $40,000 
$40,001 - $41,232 
$41,233 - $75,000 
$75,001 - $77,336  
$77,337 - $95,631 
$95,632 - $113,911  
$113,912 - $150,000 
$150,00 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.34 
0.44 
0.60 
0.515 
0.615 
0.415 
0.715 
0.415 
0.465 
 
The MTR profiles in both years exhibits a much stronger “hump” or inverted U-shape, 
due to the withdrawal of FTB Part A at 20 cents in the dollar from $33,362 in 2005-06 
and $40,000 in 2006-07, and the withdrawal of the Medicare Levy low income 
exemption.  The second hump in the profiles further along the distribution is due to the 
withdrawal of the base rate of FTB Part A at 30 cents in the dollar.  Since both FTB Part 
A and the Medicare Levy exemption are withdrawn on joint income, a second earner 
going out to work within the income range of the first “hump” will face an effective tax 
rate that includes the withdrawal rates of both.  In addition, she will lose an extra 20 cents 
in the dollar due to the withdrawal of FTB Part B.  The end result is an income tax system 
that very closely approximates one of joint taxation across much of the distribution of 
family income but with a difference. Under a conventional joint tax (or income splitting) 
system, the MTR schedule is typically progressive.  Australian families face an inverted 
U-shaped schedule. 
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Because the 2006-07 Budget reduces tax burdens for the average income single-earner 
family by raising the threshold for the withdrawal of FTB Part A and lowering the rate of 
withdrawal for the Medicare Levy exemption, the hump in the MTR profile shifts along 
the distribution, and is also extended, as shown in Table 7.  Thus the Budget changes 
have the effect of bringing more families on average incomes into the net of a system of 
joint taxation, and one which applies an inverted U–shaped schedule of MTRs to their 
family incomes.  The second earner can face especially high effective MTRs and ATRs 
as she increases her hours of work if the primary earner of the family falls within the 
income range of the first hump in the MTR profile.  Table 8 gives, as an example, the 
MTRs and ATRs on the second earnings of a family in which primary income is $40,000 
pa in both financial years   
 
Table 8:  Second earner’s effective marginal and average tax rates* 
 
2005-06 2006-07 
Second earner’s 
taxable income 
 
MTR 
 
ATR 
Second earner’s  
taxable income 
 
MTR 
 
ATR 
$0 - $4088 
$4089 - $7567 
$7,568- $20,951 
$20,952 - $21,000 
$21,001 - $27,475 
$27,476 - $29,715  
$29,716 - $40,000 
0.215 
0.415 
0.565 
0.365 
0.555 
0.515 
0.315 
0.215 
0.307 
0.472 
0.469 
0.487 
0.488 
0.444 
$0 – $1232 
$1233-$4234 
$4235- $10,000 
$10,001- $21,572 
$21,573-$25,000 
$25,001 - $37,337  
$37,338 - $40,000 
0.30 
0.215 
0.415 
0.565 
0.365 
0.555 
0.355 
0.300 
0.240 
0.341 
0.461 
0.448 
0.483 
0.475 
 * Primary earner income = $40,000 pa 
 
In 2005-06 the second earner lost almost half her income at around $20,000.  While the 
2006-07 Budget reduced losses for second earners at lower income levels, it raised rates 
as her income approached that of the primary earner.  At $40,000, for example, the 
second earner’s MTR and ATR are, in fact, higher in 2006-07. When both parents earn 
$40,000 pa, a figure that is well below average earnings, the second earner loses 47.5 per 
cent of her wages, which is more than she would have lost in the previous year.  This is 
because the 2006-07 Budget changes were designed to exclude the family with more 
equal partner incomes from a gain from the rise in the FTB Part A lower income 
threshold to $40,000, and from a personal tax cut above $510 for each parent, by 
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completely withdrawing the low income offset at $40,000.  These measures not only have 
the effect of shifting the share of the family tax burden towards the second earner, they 
also shift the overall tax burden towards two-earner families in which each parent’s 
income ranges from around $40,000 to $63,000.  Thus, while the new discrimination 
impacts directly on the second earner, its indirect effect is upon families in which both 
parents work full-time to earn similar but relatively low and average wages.  
 
To gives an indication of the distributional limitations of the Howard Government new 
tax system in 2006-07, Table 9 translates family tax burdens into “hours worked to pay 
tax”, or the “hours of work equivalent” of the family’s tax, for Type 1 and Type 2 
households, by quintiles of primary income.  The first row for each type reports the 
average tax burden on families in each quintile, and the second row, hours worked to pay 
tax.   
 
Table 9:  Hours worked to pay tax, by primary income and household type, 2006-07 
 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Type 1       
Total tax $pa -6956 43 4412 10991 37308 9456 
Hours worked to pay tax - - 155 394 687 - 
Type 2       
Total tax $pa 38 9010 14720 20760 39141 16545 
Hours worked to pay tax pa - 574 764 925 1177 - 
 
 
In quintile 3, the average tax burden for the Type 2 household is equivalent to 764 hours 
of work for the government per year.  This is more than the hours worked to pay tax by 
the average Type 1 household in quintile 5 on a much higher income.  The Type 2 in 
quintile 2 works an average of 574 hours for the government.  This is some 50 per cent 
higher than the hours reported for a Type 1 household in quintile 4, and is approaching 
the number of hours worked for the government by the Type 1 household in quintile 5, on 
a very much higher primary income.   
 
Taxes on second earners and their families at these levels, together with a lack of access 
to affordable, high quality childcare, can be expected to have strong negative effects on 
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female labour supply, not only during the child rearing years but throughout the life 
cycle.19  This is evident from lifecycle time allocation profiles for selected OECD 
countries reported in Apps (2006a). 
  
4 Concluding Comments 
 
In this paper I have argued that the Australian family tax system is fundamentally flawed, 
as a result of policy changes that have transformed it from a progressive individual 
income tax system to one much more closely resembling joint taxation.  These policies 
constitute what I have elsewhere labelled the “new discrimination”. The problem lies not 
in the level of family benefits, but in the effective marginal tax rate structure created by 
the withdrawal of benefits on household income and the income of the second earner. 
The introduction of this new system over successive budgets has shifted the tax burden 
from single-earner to two-earner couples in a way that is bad for both efficiency and 
equity.  
 
Policies that raise marginal rates on the second income tax more heavily the partner with 
the more elastic labour supply, in contradiction of the standard principle for minimising 
the deadweight efficiency loss from taxation.  The resulting tax rate structure seriously 
inhibits the reallocation of female time from the household to the market during a period 
of declining fertility and therefore of falling demand for domestic labour.20   
 
Imposing high average tax rates on the second income also ignores the fact that of two 
households with the same total household income, where one has the second earner 
working entirely in the market, the other entirely in the household, the latter will have a 
significantly higher standard of living because of its higher level of output of household 
goods and services.  
 
                                                 
19 See Shaw (1994). 
20 For further discussion, and comparisons with the US, UK and Sweden tax systems, see Apps (2006a). 
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Large family benefits can be justified as a response to market failure. Children, or their 
parents as their agents, cannot borrow on capital markets against their future incomes to 
finance their current consumption and investment in human capital, or obtain cover in 
insurance markets for the risks they face. In the absence of public support, not by 
financial transfers but by a publicly funded school system, there would be 
underinvestment in the next generation. It does not seem to be appreciated that a similar 
argument applies to childcare, a badly neglected sector in Australia. A high quality, 
affordable, publicly provided childcare system would more than repay itself in expanded 
female labour supply and the likely increase in fertility that would result from making it 
more feasible for women to combine a career with having children. 
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